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Joint income-tax and VAT-chain evasion / Silvia Fedeli. Francesco Forte
Main Author: FEDELI, Silvia Coauthor: FORTE, Francesco Conjunt level: / European journal of political economy / ed. Aryne L. Hillman, Heinrich W. Ursprung, Frans A.A.M. Van Winden. - V. 15, n. 3(September 1999)- . - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1999- . - ISSN 0176-2680. - P. 391-415 Topical name: Modelo | Imposto sobre os Rendimentos | Evasão Fiscal | Equilíbrio de Nash* | Economia Paralela | Negociação Classification: H250/260:C700
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| Item type | Location | Call Number | Status | Date Due |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Analítico | Mediateca da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa | EJPE P160-251 (Browse Shelf) | Empréstimo local |
Resumo:
We consider joint income-tax evasion and VAT-chain evasion, acknowledging that decisions are not taken by agents in isolation, but result from negotiation between purchasers and suppliers in the chain of exchanges from producers/importers to final consumers. We establish outcomes in terms of nash-bargaining-equilibria, and show that the greatest evasion is at the last stage of the chain. We than consider strategies that either recover lost revenues or deter tax evasion of all taxpayers in the chain.
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