Corruption, extortion and evasion / Michael Keen, Abhinay Muthoo Jean Hindriks
Main Author: HINDRIKS, Jean Coauthor: KEEN, MichaelMUTHOO, Abhinay Conjunt level: / Journal of public economics / ed. R.H. Gordon, J.M. Poterba. - V. 74, n. 3(December 1999)- . - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1999- . - ISSN 0047-2727. - P. 395-430. Topical name: Modelo | Corrupção | Evasão Fiscal | Extorsão | Administração Fiscal | Tributação | Abuso de Poder | Informação Assimétrica* Classification: H200:D790
| Item type | Location | Call Number | Status | Date Due |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Analítico | Mediateca da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa | JPE H000-215 (Browse Shelf) | Empréstimo local |
Sumário:
1. Introduction
2. The model
3. Positive issues
4. Optimal tax schemes
5. Summary and concluding remarks
Resumo:
Corruption, evasion and the abuse of power - and the possibility thereof - are pervasive features of economic activity. A prominent instance is tax collection. This paper examines the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of (potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes. Amongst the findings are that: the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual in pratice; and collecting progressive taxes without inducing evasion or corruption may require that inspectors be paid commission on high income reports (but not on low), with the cost of this potentially creating what seems to be a previously-unnoticed trade-offbetween equity and efficiency.
There are no comments for this item.